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Reliability, risk and resilience are strongly related concepts and have been widely utilised in the context
of water infrastructure performance analysis. However, there are many ways in which each measure can
be formulated (depending on the reliability of what, risk to what from what, and resilience of what to
what) and the relationships will differ depending on the formulations used. This research has developed
a framework to explore the ways in which reliability, risk and resilience may be formulated, identifying
possible components and knowledge required for calculation of each and formalising the conceptual
relationships between specified and general resilience. This utilises the Safe & SuRe framework, which
shows how threats to a water system can result in consequences for society, the economy and the
environment, to enable the formulations to be derived in a logical manner and to ensure consistency in
any comparisons. The framework is used to investigate the relationship between levels of reliability, risk
and resilience provided by multiple operational control and design strategies for an urban wastewater
system case study. The results highlight that, although reliability, risk and resilience values may exhibit
correlations, designing for just one is insufficient: reliability, risk and resilience are complementary
rather than interchangeable measures and one cannot be used as a substitute for another. Furthermore, it
is shown that commonly used formulations address only a small fraction of the possibilities and a more
comprehensive assessment of a system's response to threats is necessary to provide a comprehensive
understanding of risk and resilience.
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Reliability and risk have been widely used as the primary cri-
terion in water infrastructure design and operation. Conventional
design aims to provide a high degree of reliability (Butler et al.,
2017) and risk analysis is commonly used to address the response
to threats. However, there are limitations to risk assessment: not all
risks can be quantified due to the existence of emerging and un-
observed threats (Park et al., 2013), unforeseeable threats cannot be
included, and highly improbable events which have a high degree
of uncertainty are dealt with poorly. Only threats which are known
and can be assigned a probability can be analysed, so calculated risk
depends onwhat is and is not known (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). Inpple).
ier Ltd. This is an open access articrecent years, the resilience concept has evolved and is beginning to
be incorporated in the design and operation of various water sys-
tems, sometimes in combination with risk and reliability (Asefa
et al., 2014; Hoque et al., 2012). However, the relative importance
of these three terms, their interdependencies and their impact on
system performance are currently poorly understood.
Reliability, risk and resilience are strongly related concepts
(Scholz et al., 2011) and the relationship between reliability and risk
has been well developed in the context of infrastructure perfor-
mance analysis. There have also been more recent studies into re-
lationships with resilience. The US Homeland Security Studies and
Analysis Institute (2010), for example, comprehensively studied
risk and resilience relationships (qualitatively and quantitatively),
by generating a risk-resilience matrix and adopting of mathemat-
ical methods to identify influencing factors in a system. The ETH
Zürich Centre for Security Studies (2011) conceptualized the risk
and resilience relationship using three different perspectives thatle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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considering resilience ‘as a goal of risk management’
(Ongkowwijoyo and Doloi, 2018; Serre and Heinzlef, 2018); b)
considering it ‘as part of risk management’ (Hoque et al., 2012;
Kammouh et al., 2017; Mitchell and Harris, 2012; Shafieezadeh and
Burden, 2014); and c) considering it ‘as an alternative/comple-
mentary to risk management’ (Homeland Security Studies and
Analysis Institute, 2010; Joyce et al., 2018; Kammouh et al., 2017;
Park et al., 2013). The latter argues that risk and resilience are
differentiable concepts but interrelated, complementary, mutually
reinforcing and could be coupled to improve adaptive capacity of
engineering systems.
Whilst risk and resilience have previously been compared
conceptually (e.g. Aven, 2011; Baum, 2015), there are many ways in
which each term can be formulated (depending on the reliability of
what, risk to what fromwhat, and resilience of what to what) and the
relationships will differ depending on the formulations used. It is
recognised that resilience, for example, can exist at different scales,
time periods and systems, and there may be trade-offs between
these which are key to the assessment and management of resil-
ience (Chelleri et al., 2015). However, the multiple different ways in
which resilience can be formulated have not previously been for-
malised. Risk has previously been decomposed using a matrix
approach to show the links between multiple ‘initiating events’,
intermediate states and final damage states (Kaplan et al., 1983),
but analysis of specific formulations was not carried out. The cur-
rent lack of understanding of all the ways in which reliability, risk
and resilience can be formulated within the same framework poses
a barrier to a comprehensive understanding of their relationships
and comparison on a like-for-like basis.
Urban wastewater system studies have typically aimed to
reduce level of service failures under design conditions (i.e. in-
crease reliability) (e.g. Juznic-Zonta et al., 2012; Oliveira and Von
Sperling, 2008), and there has also been research into risk (e.g.
Astaraie-Imani et al., 2012) and resilience (e.g. Matthews, 2016;
Schoen et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2012) individually. Resilience
analysis can provide additional understanding of wastewater sys-
tem performance, provide greater scope than risk analysis and
account for a wider range of threats (particularly those that are
low-probability and high-impact). It can also provide greater
insight into the failure characteristics, since it is commonly
assumed to be dependent on both the magnitude and duration of
failures (Butler et al., 2016; Mugume et al., 2015). There is also an
increasing interest in building resilience in practice, as evidenced,
for example, by the ‘resilience duty’ imposed in the UK Water Act
(HM Government, 2014), and the rapid growth in the publication of
papers relating to resilience in a range of fields.
Juan-García et al. (2017) conducted a comprehensive and critical
review of the state of the art in resilience assessment inwastewater
systems management and defined future research directions that
will contribute to the operationalisation of resilience; however, the
relationship between risk and resilience and whether, for example,
resilience analysis can replace risk assessment, is still unclear. With
respect to reliability, risk and resilience, there is a lack of studies on
wastewater systems that consider all three metrics as separate
criteria for design and operation and explore their relationships
both conceptually and quantitatively. Wang and Blackmore (2012)
calculated separate values for each; however, these were for a
rainwater harvesting system and, whilst they were all used to
inform the design process, the relationships between the perfor-
mance measures was not explored. Other publications focusing on
different water systems have also not evaluated all three metric
and/or explored their relationships in a quantitative manner.
Blackmore and Plant (2008), for example, discussed the differences
between risk management and resilience approaches, but did notexplore these in a case study and did not undertake a quantitative
analysis. Reliability was not discussed. In other studies that have
used a case study and provided a quantitative analysis (e.g. Su et al.,
2018), resilience has been considered a component of risk assess-
mente separate risk and resilience values have not been computed
and risk and resilience have not been compared.
This paper, therefore, presents an innovative framework to
explore the relationships between reliability, risk and resilience
levels provided by multiple operational control and design options
for a case study integrated urban wastewater system (IUWS: sewer
catchment, wastewater treatment plant and receiving river
considered as a whole). In this, the multiple ways in which reli-
ability, risk and resilience can be formulated are captured and
formalised in a single framework for the first time, and the po-
tential advantages or disadvantages of each formulation are
investigated. The framework also reveals the prerequisite knowl-
edge required for calculations under each formulation, clearly
illustrating the differences between what can be addressed by
reliability risk and resilience assessments. This research builds
upon the Safe & SuRe framework (Butler et al., 2016), which shows
how threats to a water system can result in consequences for so-
ciety, the economy and the environment, to enable the formula-
tions to be derived in a logical manner and to ensure consistency in
any comparisons.
This paper does not aim to quantify the correlations between
reliability, risk and resilience in a general sense (although numer-
ical values specific to the case study are presented and discussed),
as the numerical values will vary depending on the system evalu-
ated. However, formalisation of the conceptual formulations of
each measure illustrates the overlap in what is addressed by each,
as well as the differences.
The conceptual decomposition of reliability, risk and resilience
into all their possible formulations provided in this study, enables
future analyses to be placed within the wider picture, ensuring that
any comparisons aremade on a suitable basis and using compatible
formulations. The results also highlight the gaps in many analyses
of risk and resilience, showing that commonly used formulations
address only a small fraction of the possibilities. Means by which a
more comprehensive assessment of a system's response to threats
can be achieved, are also identified.
This research complements the increasing number of projects
and initiatives focused on resilience (including, for example, the
‘100 Resilient Cities’ initiative (Rockefeller Foundation, 2018), the
EU-funded IMPROVER (IMPROVER, 2018) and RESILENS (RESILENS,
2018) projects, the EPSRC-funded BRIM network (BRIM, 2018), and
the ‘Resilience Shift’ project funded by Lloyd's Register Foundation
(Resilience Shift, 2018)) and contributes to the rapidly growing
body of research in this field. The proposed methodology could also
be applied to other types of integrated systems analysis (e.g. water,
energy, food, waste, climate etc.) and contribute to future de-
velopments in these areas.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Formulating reliability, risk and resilience in the Safe & SuRe
framework
For reliability, risk and resilience to be fully defined, it is
necessary to specify ‘reliability of what’, ‘risk to what fromwhat’ and
‘resilience of what’ (or ‘resilience of what to what’), i.e. where the
failure and causal event characteristics are measured. This study
builds upon the Safe & SuRe framework, as illustrated in Fig. 1, to
show the potential failures and their causal events. There are many
options and combinations that can be chosen, and all are identified
before selection of a set that enables comparable reliability, risk and
Fig. 1. Potential components of reliability, risk and resilience mapped onto the Safe & SuRe framework.
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In the Safe & SuRe framework, ‘threats’ are stresses or shocks
which may affect the system infrastructure (e.g. a storm event) and
can be reduced by mitigation measures; ‘impacts’ are the effects on
level of service resulting from system failures (e.g. pump failure)
andmay be reduced with adaptationmeasures; and ‘consequences’
are the effects on society, the economy and the environment
resulting from the impacts (e.g. eutrophication) and may be
reduced with coping strategies. An ‘event’ which may result in a
failure could be a threat, a system failure or a change in level of
service provision (an impact). ‘Failure’ could refer to the adverse
effects of an event on the system (e.g. physical failure of system
components), level of service (i.e. failure to provide the required
level of service) or on the society, economy and environment (i.e.
adverse consequences).
In the Safe & SuRe framework, threats, system failure states,
impacts and consequences are each presented as a single compo-
nent; however, these can all be further categorised as ‘known’ or
‘unknown’, depending on whether or not there is knowledge of
their potential existence prior to their occurrence. Known event
types include both ‘known knowns’ and ‘known unknowns’, whereknown knowns are well understood and their characteristics
identified, and known unknowns poorly understood but known to
exist (illustrated in Fig. 2). Attempts to quantify known unknowns
may be based on past experience but are subject to uncertainty.
Unknowns cannot be characterised since their existence is not
recognised. Whilst their existence has been acknowledged, un-
known threats and unknown consequences have not previously
been considered explicitly or in detail in the Safe& SuRe framework
(Butler et al., 2016). Including these two elements in following
formulation of reliability, risk and resilience is an important step
forward as it facilitates a detailed understanding of all the elements
that contribute to of reliability, risk and resilience, and shows the
interdependencies between known and unknown threats, (known)
system failure modes, (known) impacts and known and unknown
consequences. It also clearly illustrates the challenges in providing
a comprehensive assessment.
Both known and unknown threats (TK and TU) and conse-
quences (CK and CU) exist. However, it is (reasonably) assumed that,
for a well-characterised IUWS, all potential system failure states
(SK) can be identified (i.e. there are no unknowns and the number
of knowns is finite). All types of potential impact (IK) are also
Fig. 2. Known/unknown causal event and failure characteristic matrix; degree of characterisation indicated refer to the causal event(s), examples relate to the ‘known’ elements
(causal events and/or resultant failures).
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quirements. The interdependencies of these components are
shown in Fig. 1: Known system failure states result from both
known and unknown threats, known impacts results from known
system failure states only, and known impacts can result in both
known and unknown consequences.
Note that ‘threat’, ‘system failure state’, ‘impact’ and ‘conse-
quence’ refer only to the type of event, each of which can encom-
pass a range of different magnitude and duration events of that
type. For example, population growth is one potential threat, but
this might be 10% or 100%. Although all potential types of system
failure and impact are known, their characteristics are unknown if
the cause is not specified: Due to the chain of events (shown in
Fig. 1), all consequences, impacts and system failure states are ul-
timately affected by both known and unknown threats and hence
their characteristics cannot be fully defined. While the types of
impact, for example, are all known, the probability, magnitude and
duration of these in a general sense cannot be determined since
they are partly dependent on unknown threats; it is only possible to
determine the probability, magnitude and duration of impacts
under specified system failures and/or specified known threats.
A summary of potential events and failures and their charac-
teristics, as may be considered components of reliability, risk and
resilience, is given in Table 1. Note that knowledge of the proba-
bility distribution function, magnitudes and durations may be
incomplete even for known threats, due to the existence of un-
known unknowns. Also, known probabilities cannot reasonably
cover the complete range of event scales that are theoretically
possible since there is likely to be very little data from which a
frequency distribution can be derived for particularly rare events
(Wang and Blackmore, 2009). Calculation of joint probabilities of
two or more major events occurring simultaneously poses an even
greater challenge (Park et al., 2013).
Although many possible formulations of reliability, risk and
resilience exist, performance metrics can only be calculated for
thosewhich do not require knowledge of unknown failure or causal
event types or unknown characteristics (probability, magnitude
and duration). The following sections, therefore, investigate thecomponents and pre-requisite knowledge required for all formu-
lations possible within the Safe & SuRe framework, to enable
identification of those that can and cannot be calculated (theoret-
ically) and facilitate investigation into the relationships between
reliability, risk and resilience.2.1.1. Reliability
Reliability (Rel) is defined here as “the degree to which the system
minimises level of service failure frequency over its design life when
subject to standard loading” (Butler et al., 2017). It is typically rep-
resented by the probability of success, or probability of a system
being in a non-failure state (Hashimoto et al., 1982; Kjeldsen and
Rosbjerg, 2004), as in Eq. (1).
Rel ¼ 1 PðfailureÞ (1)
In order to calculate reliability, it is necessary to specify where
the failure state is measured (i.e. reliability of what). Based on the
definition given, this should be the level of service (impact).
However, there are further options (such as reliability of a specific
system component) and, given their common usage, it is useful to
identify these too.
Using the Safe & SuRe framework and components identified in
Fig.1, reliability can be formulated in sixways, as detailed in Table 2.
Not all reliability measures detailed are useful: it is unclear what
would represent a failure with respect to the society/economy/
environment, and formulations R5 and R6 are unlikely to be used in
practice. However, provided failure limits can be defined, reliability
is theoretically calculable using any of the formulations listed since
it addresses only performance under standard loading (i.e. known
knowns e any event which is rare enough to be a known unknown
or completely unknown is not considered standard).2.1.2. Resilience
The Safe & SuRe definition of resilience, “the degree to which the
system minimises level of service failure magnitude and duration over
its design life when subject to exceptional conditions” (Butler et al.,
2017), is used in this study. This contains two components:
Table 1
Potential reliability, risk and resilience components and their characteristics in a Safe & SuRe context. Grey shading represents unknown or incalculable failure or causal event
types and characteristics. P denotes probability distribution, mag denotes set of event/failure magnitudes and dur denotes set of failure or causal event durations.
Table 2
Reliability formulations.
Formulation Failure/non-failure state assessment Description
R1 Specified system component Reliability of specified system component
R2 All system components Reliability of system
R3 Specified impacts Reliability of specified level of service provision
R4 All impacts Reliability of level of service provision
R5 Specified (known) consequences Reliability of specified society/economy/environment component
R6 All known consequences Reliability of society/economy/environment
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what causes the failure (although it may be specified) since the
probability dimension, as used in risk assessment, is not conven-
tionally included in resilience (Aven, 2011).
Resilience can be specified or general. For general resilience e
“The resilience of any and all parts of a system to all kinds of shocks,
including novel ones” (Folke et al., 2010) e it is necessary to specify
resilience of what (i.e. where the failure is measured). This en-
compasses the response to all future threats, including those
which are unknown and unforeseeable. ‘Resilience of an IUWS’,
for example, is a measure of the magnitude and duration of effects
on the IUWS resulting from any threat, including those that
cannot be foreseen. For specified resilience e “resilience of some
particular part of a system … to one or more identified kinds of
shocks” (Folke et al., 2010) e resilience of what to what (i.e. where
the failure state is measured and what the causal event considered
is) must be specified. An example would be ‘resilience of an IUWS
to storm events’, in which the magnitude and duration of the ef-
fects of the storm events on the IUWS determine the resilience
value.
Possible points in the Safe & SuRe framework which the failure
magnitude and durationmay relate to are shown in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3a,
the cause of the failure (causal event) is specified: these formula-
tions, therefore, relate to specified resilience. General resilience
uses the formulations in Fig. 3b, since the failures here can result
from anything.
Resilience cannot be calculated in formulations in which the
magnitude and duration of the failure are unknown; however,
knowledge of the probability of the causal event is not required.
Therefore, resilience can (theoretically) be calculated under twelvedifferent formulations (S1-S2, S4 and S7-S12 in Fig. 3a and G2 and
G5-G6 in Fig. 3b).
Haimes (2009) argues that general resilience cannot be calcu-
lated, since it requires knowledge of the response to any threat, but
this is not always the case. Resilience cannot be calculated under
formulation G3 (resilience of society, economy and the environ-
ment), as this requires knowledge of unknown consequences, and
G1 and G4 (resilience of system and resilience of specified system
component) are also incalculable since not all threats which may
cause system failures are known. However, the framework pre-
sented illustrates that general resilience can be calculated through
a middle state based analysis, as in G2 and G5, as both known and
unknown threats result in the same known, finite set of system
failure modes. Take, for example, formulation G2, resilience of level
of service. This may be modelled as ‘resilience of level of service to
any threat’, which cannot be calculated since not all threats are
known, but also as ‘resilience of level of service to any system
failure’, which can be calculated as all the modes by which the
system may fail are identifiable; what threat (known or unknown)
causes them is irrelevant since, by evaluating all system failure
modes, the potential effects of all threats are captured. Multiple
threats can thus be addressed with analysis of a smaller number of
system failure modes.
Traditionally, resilience has focussed on the failure of assets;
however, asset failure may not necessarily affect level of service
provision and may be irrelevant from a consumer perspective
(Ofwat, 2010). This suggests that, although formulation S1 may be
of interest to the asset owners, an impact or consequence based
approach (such as G5 or G6) is of greater benefit. Similar applies to
reliability and risk.
Fig. 3. Possible combinations of failure location and causal event in the Safe & SuRe framework: a) with specified (known) cause of failure, as required for specified risk or specified
resilience; b) with any cause of failure, as required for general risk or general resilience. Refer to Fig. 1 for interpretation of circular framework diagrams. Detailed descriptions are
provided in the Supplementary Information.
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Definitions and use of the term ‘risk’ are inconsistent. Whilst
risk is conventionally calculated as a function of probability and
consequence of a given scenario (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981), often
in practice the severity of the resultant adverse effects are not
accounted for. Konstantinou et al. (2011), for example, defined
risk as the conditional probability of incurring loss or damage
under certain unfavourable circumstances, and in terms of
practical application, the Environment Agency's flood risk maps
(Environment Agency, 2018) show only the probability of flood-
ing (with no indication of severity). Such an approach may be
acceptable when knowledge of the degree of the damage is not
required (e.g. if knowing simply whether or not flooding occurs,
irrespective of depth, is sufficient). However, it is also argued that
risk should provide a measure of the potential losses or adverse
effects (Scholz et al., 2011) and it is generally quantified using a
function of event frequency and effect magnitude (Blackmore
and Plant, 2008); this is the interpretation used in this work.
The following equation, adapted from the typical ‘probability x
consequence’ to fit the terminology of this study, is used here to
represent risk.
Risk ¼ Pðcasual eventÞ magnitudeðfailureÞ (2)
In calculation of risk, the casual event probability and failure
magnitude could be measured at different locations: for example,
when calculating the risk of a combined sewer overflow (CSO)
resulting from a storm event, ‘failure’ could refer to either the
occurrence of a CSO or the occurrence of deterioration in the
receiving water body quality; in the case of the former, the causalevent could be considered the storm event, whereas for the latter
either the storm event or the CSO could be considered as the causal
event. Hence, for absolute clarity, it is necessary to specify risk to
what from what (i.e. where the effect is measured and the potential
cause of that considered).
For conventional risk calculation, both the probability of the
causal event and themagnitude of its effects (the failure) need to be
known and measurable. Accordingly, Fig. 3 illustrates all potential
combinations of ‘failure’ and ‘causal event’ within the Safe & SuRe
framework and identifies those which result in a calculable risk
formulation. Similarly to resilience, risk formulations in which a
specific causal event is identified may be classified as ‘specified
risk’, and those which address risk from any (known or unknown)
event can be classified as general risk. Risk cannot be calculated in
formulations which include unknown threats in the causal events
(i.e. the ‘general’ formulations, G1-G6 in Fig. 3b) since, by definition,
these cannot be characterised; this is in contrast to resilience,
where it is not necessary to know, for example, the probability of
the events that may result in failures. Similarly, risk cannot be
calculated in formulations that include unknown consequences in
the measured failures (i.e. formulations S3-S6, S9 and S11 in Fig. 3a,
and G3 in Fig. 3b). Furthermore, risk cannot be calculated if the
required causal event probability or failure magnitude is unknown
despite the existence of the causal event or failure type being
known (formulations S10 and S12 in Fig. 3a). This leaves five for-
mulations (S1, S2 and S7eS9 in Fig. 3a) under which risk may be
calculated in the Safe & SuRe framework. Further details, including
equations for each formulation, are provided in the Supplementary
Information.
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2.2.1. Reliability and risk
There is widely assumed to be a connection between reliability
and risk. However, the nature of this relationship is less clear. Some
consider increasing reliability to be analogous to decreasing risk,
for example, with high risk equating to low reliability
(Konstantinou et al., 2011). However, others consider reliability a
contributor to risk, as it contributes to the probability of failure, but
is not the only component (Zio, 2013). This corresponds with the
risk assessment approach of Kjeldsen and Rosbjerg (2004), and
suggests that, although increasing reliability may contribute to a
reduction in risk, other factors must also be considered.
2.2.2. Reliability and resilience
Reliability may be considered a prerequisite and/or a compo-
nent of resilience (Butler et al., 2017; Francis and Bekera, 2014), or
alternatively a complementary performance indicator (e.g.
Kjeldsen and Rosbjerg, 2004). As for risk, this suggests that
increasing reliability may contribute to efforts to increase resilience
but additional measures are also required.
2.2.3. Risk and resilience
Resilience is differentiable from but complementary to risk
analysis (Park et al., 2013); however, there is often overlap and
confusion in use of the two terms, and resilience analysis in practice
is commonly based on the concept of risk. The Overseas Develop-
ment Institute (Mitchell and Harris, 2012), for example, have pub-
lished a ‘risk management approach’ to resilience, and Halcrow,
(2008) have produced a ‘Service Risk Framework’ for assessment
of resilience.
Fig. 3 highlights the broader scope of resilience assessment: risk
can only be calculated under five of the eighteen possible formu-
lations and cannot account for unknown threats, whereas resilience
can be calculated under nine (including all for which risk can be
calculated). Risk cannot be calculated under formulations S4 and
S10-12 (amongst others) since these require knowledge of proba-
bilities that cannot be determined (P(SK,x) and P(IK,y)); despite the
event type being specified and known in these cases, its probability
is not known as it may occur as a result of unknown threats (the
probabilities of which are not known). Resilience can be calculated
under formulations S4 and S10-12, however, since this does not
require knowledge of the probability of the event(s) resulting in
failure.
Risk cannot be calculated under the formulations used for
general resilience (G2, G5 or G6) since knowledge of the probability
of unknown threats is required in every case. Even if the probability
can be expressed as the probability of infrastructure failure or
probability of level of service failure (as in G6, for example), it is still
affected by unknown threats and cannot be calculated. To be
calculable, risk must be specified. General resilience formulations
could be considered more useful for detailed system analysis, since
they include a measure of the response to any threat, including
unknowns, but they are also more challenging to calculate for this
very reason.
2.2.4. Reliability, risk and resilience
Based on the definitions and discussion in Section 2.1, the con-
ceptual relationships between reliability, risk and resilience with
respect to the probability and magnitude of events addressed are
presented graphically in Fig. 4. Reliability concerns performance
under ‘standard loading’, which will typically cover the relatively
low magnitude, high probability events which are expected to
occur within the system's design life. Risk can address more
extreme events with a lower probability and higher magnitude, butstill cannot deal with events that are considered too unlikely to be
assigned a probability with any degree of certainty or events that
cannot be foreseen. Resilience can address the same events as risk
assessment but, as it is not necessary to know the probability, can
also consider the system response to and recovery frommuchmore
extreme events (including so called ‘black swans’) which, although
highly unlikely, may occur.
2.3. Integrated urban wastewater system case study
2.3.1. Case study
The case study IUWS used (shown diagrammatically in Fig. 5) is
a semi-hypothetical system that was originally presented by
Schütze et al. (2002) and has since been the subject of many studies
(e.g. Butler and Schütze, 2005; Fu et al., 2008; Zacharof et al., 2004).
It comprises a sewer system, a wastewater treatment plant with an
off-line pass through storage tank at the inlet, and a river (of which
45 km is modelled). It was simulated using SIMBA6 (IFAK, 2009). It
should be noted that, as the model is of a semi-hypothetical system
and risk and resilience assessments are based on the modelling of
extreme events, including those that have not previously
happened, the complete integrated model cannot be calibrated and
the results cannot be validated using data from real events.
Performance evaluation is based on simulation of a seven day
rainfall event with a total depth of 27mm. Dynamic outputs used
are the dissolved oxygen (DO) and ammonium concentrations in
the river. Un-ionised ammonium concentration is estimated from
the total ammonium using a conversion factor of 0.0195 (based on a
pH of 7.7 and a temperature of 20 C (Schütze et al., 2002). Further
details on the IUWS model simulation are given by Astaraie-Imani
et al. (2012).
Ten operational control and design parameters (detailed in
Table 3) are used as decision variables and sampled using Latin
Hypercube Sampling to produce a set of 400 options for evaluation
in this study. These parameters include four sewer storage tank
volumes, maximum pumped outflow from each storage tank
(above which CSOs occur), maximum flow to the wastewater
treatment plant (WWTP) and the WWTP influent threshold trig-
gering emptying of the storm tank. Upper and lower limits for
operational decision variables are extended beyond those typically
considered so as to provide a greater range of reliability, risk and
resilience values. It is recognised that this approach may produce
many solutions with poor performance; however, it should also
yield options providing a high level of performance and it is
important that a wide range is captured so as to gain a more
complete picture of the relationships between reliability, risk and
resilience.
2.3.2. Reliability, risk and resilience formulation
In order that reliability, risk and resilience can be compared, it is
important that compatible formulations are used for each. For risk
and resilience, formulation S2 (risk to level of service from specified
threat and resilience of level of service to specified threat) is chosen
since this requires no knowledge of unknowns and can be calcu-
lated. For reliability, the corresponding formulation is R4 (reliability
of level of service provision).
All require measures of failure characteristics and must, there-
fore, consider the same level of service requirements to be com-
parable. In all formulations, receiving water quality represents the
level of service and level of service failure is classified as the
occurrence of a DO concentration less than 4mg/l (Fu et al., 2008)
and/or an un-ionised ammonia concentration greater than
0.068mg/l (Johnson et al., 2007). The specified threat considered
for risk and resilience is population increase, which is modelled as
an increase in dry weather flow (DWF). The reliability, risk and
Fig. 4. Conceptual relationships between reliability, risk and resilience with respect to the probability and magnitude of events addressed.
Fig. 5. Schematic diagram of the semi-hypothetical IUWS case study, with base case dry weather flows (units m3/d) and tank volumes indicated. SC denotes subcatchment.
Table 3
Operational control and design decision variables DWF denotes base case dry weather flow in the corresponding subcatchment(s) and DC the WWTP design capacity, as
indicated in Fig. 5.
Decision variable Description Value range
Design VST2 Storage tank 2 vol increase (%) [0, 100]
VST4 Storage tank 4 vol increase (%) [0, 100]
VST6 Storage tank 6 vol increase (%) [0, 100]
VST7 Storage tank 7 vol increase (%) [0, 100]
Operational control QST2 Maximum outflow from tank 2 before CSO (m3/d) [3DWF1,2, 8DWF1,2]
QST4 Maximum outflow from tank 4 before CSO (m3/d) [3DWF3,4, 8DWF3,4]
QST6 Maximum outflow from tank 6 before CSO (m3/d) [3DWF6, 8DWF6]
Qmaxout Maximum outflow from tank 7 before CSO (m3/d) [3DC, 8DC]
Qmaxin Maximum flow to primary clarifier (m3/d) [0.5DC, 5DC]
Qtrig WWTP influent threshold triggering emptying of the storm tank (m3/d) [4800, 40800]
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follows:
 Reliability of receiving water quality compliance
 Risk to receivingwater quality from population increase by 2035
 Resilience of receiving water quality to population increase
Note that it is necessary to define the time frame for risk
assessment since population increase probabilities are time
dependent.
The measured failure characteristics will be different in each
case as each must consider different causal event scenarios: reli-
ability relates to failures under ‘standard’ loading whereas risk re-
lates to failures under foreseeable conditions and resilience relates
to failures under exceptional conditions.
It is acknowledged that use of a resilience formulation which
incorporates response to unknowns (e.g. G2) would be preferable;
however, this would not allow risk to be calculated and compared
on a like-for-like basis.
2.3.3. Reliability, risk and resilience assessment
A brief description of the assessment methodologies is provided
here; further detail is available in the Supporting Information.
2.3.3.1. IUWS reliability assessment. Reliability is assessed under
standard conditions (i.e. no population increase) using Eq. (1),
where the probability of failure is based on the modelled level of
service failure duration.
2.3.3.2. IUWS risk assessment. Risk is evaluated for population
increases of 0e15% at 1.5% intervals, using Eq. (2). In each case,
the probability of population growth equalling or exceeding the
given value is calculated based on 95% prediction intervals re-
ported by the United Nations (Raftery et al., 2012; United
Nations, 2012) for the UK population in 2035, assuming a
normal distribution. The greater of the normalised DO deficit and
normalised un-ionised ammonia exceedance represents the
failure magnitude. This yields 16 risk values for each IUWS
operational control and design option, the highest of which is
used in the following analysis.
2.3.3.3. IUWS resilience assessment. Assessment of resilience is
based on the concept of using a response curve (system perfor-
mance as a function of disturbance magnitude) for comparison of
solutions (Diao et al., 2016; Mugume et al., 2015), where the area
under the curve provides a measure of resilience. To capture both
the magnitude and duration components of resilience, failure
characteristics are measured using two metrics, Pdeficit (based on
mean performance deficit) and Pduration,mean (based on mean failure
duration), each of which are calculated for population changes in
the range 0e150%. This yields two resilience indicators for each
option, Rdeficit and Rduration,mean.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Reliability, risk and resilience relationships
Fig. 6 shows the relationships between reliability, risk and
resilience for the 400 IUWS operational control and design op-
tions evaluated: each circle represents a different option, the
colour of the circle represents its reliability value, and its x and y
coordinates show its risk and resilience values respectively.
Fig. 6a utilises the resilience indicator based on mean perfor-
mance deficit and Fig. 6b the resilience indicator based on mean
failure duration.Fig. 6 shows that an increase in reliability typically corresponds
with reduced risk and increased resilience in this system, for the
reliability, risk and resilience formulations considered (r¼0.91
for reliability and risk, r¼ 0.97 for reliability and Rdeficit, and
r¼ 0.95 for reliability and Rduration,mean). However, most levels of
reliability can be achieved with a range of different risk and
resilience values, showing the importance of considering perfor-
mance under extreme conditions as well as standard loading.
Additionally, risk and resilience values shown in Fig. 6 reveal a
correlation (r¼0.92 for risk and Rdeficit, r¼0.83 for risk and
Rduration,mean), but they are not directly proportional e hence risk
assessment cannot be considered a substitute for resilience
assessment. With respect to the system design and operational
control, it is desirable that the same option provides the highest
reliability, lowest risk and highest resilience: This section explores
the feasibility of this goal and the observed relationships between
reliability, risk and resilience.
3.1.1. High reliability options
In Fig. 6b, reliability greater than 0.999 can be achieved with
30 operational control and design options, yet the resilience
(Rduration,mean) values of these options range from 0.85 to 0.92.
This is attributed to variation in the DO failure characteristics
resulting from the different design and operational control op-
tions: Whilst the DO failures are observed with a 15% population
increase in the lower resilience option, DO failures in the higher
resilience option are not recorded until population increase
reaches 45%, and are then of significantly shorter magnitude and
duration.
3.1.2. High reliability, low risk options
In Fig. 6b, resilience (Rduration,mean) values range from 0.87 to
0.92 for options with reliability greater than 0.999 and risk below
0.001. This indicates that there is significant variation in the
resilience of options providing low risk and high reliability
(particularly noticeable with the Rduration,mean resilience indica-
tor). Therefore, these results demonstrate that, when selecting
design and operational control options for an IUWS, high reli-
ability and low risk are necessary criteria but not sufficient for
high resilience; resilience must be considered as a third and
separate objective.
If, in this case study, no benefit of considering the three per-
formance measures as separate objectives had been found, this
would not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that (in the
wider sense) reliability, risk and resilience do not all need to be
considered in the design and operation of IUWSs. However, the
observation here that they cannot be used interchangeably is
sufficient to demonstrate that the highest reliability and lowest
risk options do not necessarily provide the highest resilience.
3.1.3. High resilience options
Fig. 6a and b also show that there can be significant variation in
the risk and reliability values for options providing a given level of
resilience. For example, in Fig. 5b, options providing a resilience
(Rduration,mean) value of 0.85 have reliability values in the range
0.910e1.000 and risk values in the range 0.023e0.176. This suggests
that consideration of greatest resilience alone is insufficient and
reliability and/or risk must also be evaluated to ensure that the
chosen option performs well under a wide range of conditions,
including standard loading. This observation is particularly
important when it is not possible to implement the option
providing the greatest resilience (e.g. due to cost restraints), as
there is greater range in risk and reliability for lower resilience
options.
The different levels of resilience, risk and reliability provided by
Fig. 6. Relationships between reliability, risk and resilience (Rdeficit and Rduration,mean) in the case study IUWS; arrows indicate direction of improved performance.
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presented in Table 3. When analysing the options providing a
resilience (Rduration,mean) value of 0.85 (as above), the option
providing highest reliability and lowest risk has larger values for
Qmaxin, QST2, QST4 and QST6. This will result in a smaller volume of
CSOs from subcatchments 1e4 and 7, as well as a greater volume of
wastewater being treated, thereby resulting in higher receiving
water quality under standard conditions. However, it only provides
the same level of resilience as that provided by a less reliable option
with greater CSOs and less wastewater treated, whereas it would
intuitively be expected to provide higher resilience than a less
reliable option. This may be attributed to it resulting in a greater
impact on level of service under extreme population increase as the
surcharged WWTP performs poorly and low quality discharge is
concentrated at the WWTP outlet instead of distributed along the
river by CSOs.Fig. 7. DO response to population increase for high3.2. Reliability-, risk- and resilience-based design
Most operational control and design options shown in Fig. 6 do
not represent realistic solutions, given their poor performance even
under standard loading/design conditions. Further analysis, there-
fore, focuses on those which provide good performance under the
base case population (i.e. have high reliability).
Example response curves for three options which provide a
reliability of at least 0.999 are shown in Fig. 7. The first (grey line)
provides a high degree of reliability only. The second (black line) is
also low risk (risk 0.001), and the third (bold, dashed line) is the
option that provides the highest level of resilience whilst also
providing high reliability and low risk. These show that a high
degree of reliability does not guarantee good performance under
disturbances; consideration of risk improves the response but
resilience assessment is required to ensure the chosen optionreliability, low risk and high resilience options.
Fig. 8. Decision variable values for options providing: a) high reliability, b) high reliability and low risk, and c) high reliability, low risk and high resilience.
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failures do occur. The difference between reliability-, risk- and
resilience-based IUWS design is most marked in Fig. 7b, where the
control and design option resulting in the greatest DO deficit
(minimum DO concentration) under any level of population in-
crease has high reliability but not low risk, and the most resilient
solution maintains the highest DO concentration (minimises the
failure magnitude) under any population increase.
To illustrate the potential differences between reliability-, risk-
and resilience-based design, the decision variable values of the
three different options are shown in Fig. 8. The high reliability
option provides a receiving water quality compliance reliability of
1.000, risk to receiving water quality from population increase of
0.023 and a receiving water quality resilience to population in-
crease (Rduration,mean) of 0.853. The high reliability and low risk
option has reliability, risk and resilience values of 1.000, 0.000 and
0.868 respectively, and in the high resilience option the resilience
(Rduration,mean) is increased to 0.922. It is shown that, whilst there are
similarities between the three options (most notably in Qmaxin and
VST7), the characteristics of the operational control and design op-
tion providing high resilience differ from those providing just high
reliability. For example, high reliability can be achieved with an
increase in storage volume of 23e31% (VST2, VST4, VST6 and VST7);
however, significantly greater increase in storage volume is
required to provide the highest level of resilience.
This suggests that identification of preferable design and oper-
ational control options, taking into account reliability, risk and
resilience, requires an understanding of the mechanism of failure
minimisation (i.e. how the different options reduce the frequency,
magnitude and duration of failure), and that there may be cost
implications of increasing resilience (e.g. due to extra storage
required).
Note that observations on the relationships between reliability,
risk and resilience in the IUWS case study are based on a formu-
lation of resilience that addresses only one known threat. The
capability of a middle-state based resilience assessment to address
multiple threats, including unknowns (as in formulation G2, for
example), has not been exploited. The benefits of a ‘high resilience’
approach over a ‘low risk’ approach are expected to be greater if
resilience is calculated using a formulation under which risk is
incalculable (e.g. S4, S10 or G2), but demonstrating the benefits is
challenging if they are not observable until the occurrence of a
previously unknown threat. Even under risk and resilienceformulation S2, however, it is shown that failure magnitude and
duration under a specified threat can be significantly reduced by
considering resilience in addition to risk.
4. Conclusions
This research has explored the ways inwhich reliability, risk and
resilience may be formulated, identifying possible components and
knowledge required for calculation of each and formalising the
conceptual relationships between specified and general resilience.
A set of corresponding formulations has also been implemented in
a case study IUWS to enable investigation into the relationships
between reliability, risk and resilience for this system. The
following conclusions are drawn:
 Many formulations of both general and specified risk and
resilience exist, but not all can be calculated due to the existence
of unknown threats and unknown consequences.
 General resilience can theoretically be calculated (under some
formulations) whereas general risk cannot. Resilience can,
therefore, address responses to a wider range of threats.
 All threats, including both known and unknown, can be
addressed with a middle-state based resilience analysis which
focusses on the level of service response to system failures. Risk
cannot be calculated on the same basis since the probability of
system failure is affected by the probability of unknown threats.
 Consideration of resilience in addition to risk can be beneficial
even when only considering specified threats, as demonstrated
in the case study. Lowest risk solutions do not necessarily pro-
vide the highest specified resilience.
 Although reliability, risk and resilience values may exhibit cor-
relations, designing for just one is insufficient: reliability, risk
and resilience are complementary measures.
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